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Parental Rights of Gay and Lesbian Couples: Will
Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage Make a Difference?
I. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
On Monday, March 17, 2004, same sex couples were granted the
right to marry in Massachusetts. Thus, the United States joined
the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada and became one of only
four countries permitting same-sex marriage. The Massachusetts
legislation permitting the legal union between partners of the
same sex was enacted in response to Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,' a case in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that same sex couples have a constitutional right
to be legally married. Massachusetts is the first state of the union
to grant the right to marry to same-sex couples.
The Goodridge case began on April 11, 2001, when fourteen in-
dividuals from Massachusetts filed a complaint against the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Public Health, seeking a declaratory
judgment against the Department and against the Commissioner
of Public Health for violating Massachusetts law by failing to pro-
vide marriage licenses to same sex couples.2 In response to claims
that failure to grant marriage licenses to same sex couples was a
violation of law, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
raised three arguments for why same sex marriages should re-
main prohibited: (1) to create a favorable setting for procreation;
(2) to provide the most favorable setting for child rearing, which
the department argued requires two parents of the opposite sex;
and (3) to preserve state resources! The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts briefly touched upon the first argument, noting
that nothing in the law requires couples to promise to procreate as
a prerequisite for obtaining a marriage license.4 The court held
that the second argument lacks validity because there are numer-
ous same-sex couples already raising children, either their own
from a previous heterosexual relationship or those adopted by the
same-sex couple.5 The court also held that state economic issues
1. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
2. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
3. Id. at 961.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 962-63.
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have no rational relationship to the issue of same-sex marriage.6
Further, the Massachusetts judges relied at least in part upon the
United Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas,7 which held
that the United States Constitution insists upon respect "for the
autonomy of the person" in making decisions regarding family,
marriage and child-rearing. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for
the five justice majority, declared in the Lawrence opinion that:
"Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do . . . ."' While the
decision in Lawrence did not expressly hold that same-sex mar-
riages are constitutionally protected, it seems to have laid the
groundwork for the Supreme Court to do so.
The legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts may
have important consequences for children either adopted or con-
ceived by one of the partners in a homosexual relationship. The
legalization of same-sex marriage, at least in Massachusetts, will
make it easier for a homosexual person to obtain custodial or visi-
tation rights to their children upon divorce or separation from
their same-sex partner. This comment addresses the unique chal-
lenges faced by homosexual couples, specifically lesbians, who are
unable to be legally married and the child custody and visitation
issues often faced when a homosexual relationship is dissolved.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
This amendment has been interpreted to include the right to es-
tablish a home and to bring up children" and prohibits states from
interfering with these liberties." However, states can intervene
into a parent-child relationship when it is determined that it is
necessary to protect the welfare of a child. 2
6. Id. at 964.
7. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
11. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
12. Brooke N. Silverthorn, When Parental Rights and Children's Best Interests Collide:
An Examination of Troxel v. Granville as it Relates to Gay and Lesbian Families, 19 GA.ST.
U.L. Rev. 893, 897 (2003).
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II. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE
In June 2000, the United States Supreme Court held that a
parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody and control of his or her children cannot be determined
solely by a judge's determination of what he believes is in a child's
best interest. 3 Troxel v. Granville, a decision by the Washington
Superior Court ordering the grant of visitation rights to grandpar-
ents, was found to be unconstitutional, as it was based solely upon
the state trial judge's beliefs that increased visitation with grand-
parents would be beneficial to the child."' The United States Su-
preme Court held,
[Sbo long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children. 5
The decision in Troxel has been seen as having great signifi-
cance for gay and lesbian families in that it requires each state
court to interpret family law statues in a manner which will con-
tinue to protect the constitutional rights of a parent in situations
where a third-party is seeking visitation or custody rights concern-
ing that parent's child. Such a situation often results from the
dissolution of a homosexual relationship. 6 Because of its require-
ment that family law statutes be interpreted in such a manner as
to protect the constitutional rights of a parent, the Troxel decision
has been most helpful to homosexual individuals in a situation
involving a challenge from a lesbian mother's ex-husband, or other
relatives, who believe that a child should not be raised by a homo-
sexual parent. 7
14. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington pro-
vides that "any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time," and author-
izes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best in-
terest of the child." This statute was struck down as violative of the mothers substantive
due process rights as it was based upon the state trial judge's beliefs that increased visita-
tion would be beneficial to the child. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
15. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Silverthorn, supra note 12, at 911 (citing Dena M. Castricone, Custody and the




In Bottoms v. Bottoms, 8 the Virginia Supreme Court awarded
custody of a child to its grandmother rather than to its mother,
who was a lesbian living with her same-sex partner. While the
Bottoms opinion properly stated that the Virginia Supreme Court
had previously held that a lesbian mother is not a per se unfit par-
ent, the dissent in the Bottoms case pointed out that the majority
ignored the trial court's refusal to apply this standard while pro-
ceeding to reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
reinstatement of the trial court's order.19 It is not clear what ef-
fect the Troxel decision would have on a case such as Bottoms to-
day, however, the Troxel decision makes it clear that state courts
are required to apply an "exceptional circumstances" analysis to
protect the biological parents' fundamental interest in making de-
cisions regarding the care of their children. 20
On the other hand, the Troxel decision may hurt many sepa-
rated lesbian couples when it is the non-biological mother who is
seeking visitation. 1 The decision in Troxel has been interpreted
by many states to place a non-biological lesbian parent on the
same footing as any other third-party. For example in In re: Bon-
field,2 the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the Troxel decision as
one that reaffirmed the family protection from interference by the
state but did not guarantee a non-biological parent the "benefit of
statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a familial arrange-
ment."23 Thus, the decision in Troxel tends to reinforce the view
that a non-biological parent in a homosexual relationship does not
have the same parental rights as the biological partner but rather
is treated the same as would any other third-party seeking visita-
tion or custody rights to a child.24
Many different doctrines have been utilized by various state
courts to better define the changing definition of what constitutes
a parent. The first and often the most difficult obstacle faced by a
non-biological parent in seeking to obtain child visitation or cus-
tody is that non-biological parent's must establish that they have
19. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
20. Id. at 109.
21. Silverthorn, supra note 12, at 909.
22. Silverthorn, supra note 12, at 911.
23. 780 N.E.2d 241 (Oh. 2002).
24. Bonfield, 780 N.E. 2d at 247. However, the court went on to state that the Ohio
Juvenile Court could take steps to determine whether shared custody was in the children's
best interest. Id. at 248.
25. Nancy D. Polikoff, Troxel's Impact on Gay and Lesbian Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J.
825, 827 (2001).
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standing to bring a claim before they may have their plea for visi-
tation or custody heard by a court.25 Standing of a non-biological
parent is most often denied on the basis of constitutional privacy
concerns based on the Fourteenth Amendment. However, recog-
nizing that the word "family" now encompasses so many different
definitions, many state courts have utilized various legal doctrines
as a tool to permit standing by a non-biological parent. Among the
various doctrines used are the doctrines of in loco parentis, psy-
chological parent, and de facto parent.
III. IN LOCO PARENTIS
The court in T.B. v. L.R.M. explained the doctrine of in loco par-
entis, which confers upon one who undertakes the duties and obli-
gations incidental to the parental relationship "the assumption of
a parental status"26 The rationale for finding standing based upon
the doctrine of in loco parentis is to protect the child's best inter-
ests when the child has established "strong psychological bonds
with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with
the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in
the child's eye a stature like that of parent."27 The court also held
that "a person may stand in loco parentis to a child regardless of
that person's ability to marry the biological parent or to adopt the
child . 2.. ""
IV. DE FACTO PARENT OR PARENT BY ESTOPPEL
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution allows one who is a "de facto parent" or a "parent by
estoppel" the right to claim partial custody.29 In E.N.O. v.
26. John C. Mayoue, BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW 149 (2d ed.
2003). Note 18, at 212.
31. Id. at 916 (citing Commonwealth v. Gerstner, 656 A.2d 108,112 (Pa. 1995))
32. Id. at 917 (citing J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1319-20).
33. T.B., 786 A.2d at 918.
34. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS states:
(b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, is
(i) liable for child support under Chapter 3; or
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and
(A) over that period had a reasonable good faith belief that he was the child's biologi-
cal father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of
the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that belief,
and
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make reason-
able, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child's father; or
Winter 2005 277
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L.M.M.,3" the ALI Principles were applied by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court to award visitation to a de facto parent under the
best interests standard. The court defined a de facto parent as:
[Oine who has no biological relation to the child, but has par-
ticipated in the child's life as a member of the child's family.
The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the con-
sent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share
of care taking functions at least as great as the legal parent.
The de facto parent shapes the child's daily routine, addresses
his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his
education and medical care, and serves as a moral guide."
E.N.O. and L.M.M. decided to have a baby via artificial insemi-
nation. L.M.M. became pregnant and E.N.O. was present during
both the actual artificial insemination sessions and the birth of
the child.3" The couple sent out birth announcements indicating
that both women were the child's parents and they executed a co-
parenting agreement which expressly stated that E.N.O. would
retain her parental status if the couple separated.33 Upon the
separation of the couple, the probate court granted to E.N.O tem-
porary visitation rights, noting that a Massachusetts paternity
statute provides that "children born to parents who are not mar-
ried to each other should be treated in the same manner as all
(iii) lived with the child since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement
with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise
a child together each with full parental rights or responsibilities, when the court
finds that recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests; or
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child's
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests.
(c) A defacto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement
of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete fail-
ure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of
the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03
(2000).
35. 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
36. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 (citing Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999)).
37. Id. at 888.
38. Id. at 889.
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other children."4 L.M.M. appealed the decision of the probate
court based on the argument that there was no statute granting
an order of visitation to a third party acting as a parent. 5 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the pro-
bate court and held that E.N.O. met the requirements of a de facto
parent, and that the grant of visitation rights in her favor was,
therefore, proper. 6 The court stated that "the recognition of de-
facto parents is in accord with notions of the modem family."3
7
Further, the court stated that the child's interest in maintaining a
relationship with E.N.O. outweighed the custodial interest of
L.M.M.38
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT
As the definition of what constitutes a family evolves, it is
harder to define the word parent.39 As our family structures con-
tinue to change there are many people who act as parents for chil-
dren but who lack legal recognition as such.0 While the opinion in
Troxel did not address the psychological parent doctrine in refus-
ing to rule that all visitation statutes include a showing of harm,
it permits the state courts to use this doctrine.41
The New Jersey Supreme Court in V.C. v. M.J.B.,42 granted visi-
tation rights to a non-biological lesbian co-parent finding that she
functioned as a "psychological parent" to the children.43 The two
women involved in the V.C. case began their relationship in 1993,
and in 1994 M.J.B. became pregnant through artificial insemina-
tion." The two attended Lamaze classes together, and V.C. was
present when M.J.B gave birth to twins. 4'5 After the birth of the
children, V.C. participated in parenting decisions, including medi-
cal decisions, and was generally held out to be the twins' 'other
39. Id. at 889, (quoting the trial court) (citing a Massachusetts child support statute
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 209C §1 (West 1998)).
40. Id. at 889-90.
41. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 894.
42. Id. at 891.
43. Id. at 893.
44. Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New AL.L Prin-
ciples, 35 WILLAMETrE L.REv. 769, 769(1999).
45. Id. at 771.
46. Silverthorn, supra note 12, at 909-10 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73).
47. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
48. V.C., 748 A.2d at 555.




mother'.46 In 1995, the couple bought a home together and had a
commitment ceremony where they, together with their children,
were blessed as a "family." 7 The couple separated in 1996, and
V.C. moved out of the home but continued to see the children
every other weekend.48 In 1997, M.J.B. stopped permitting V.C. to
spend time with the children and V.C. filed suit seeking visitation
rights.
49
The court utilized a four-part test to determine that V.C. was a
psychological parent to her former partner's biological children: (1)
the legal parent must consent to the child's relationship with the
third party; (2) the third party must have lived with the child; (3)
significant parental functions must be performed by the third
party; and (4) a parent-child bond must be formed." The court
held that once a third party is deemed a psychological parent, "he
or she stands in parity with the legal parent" and custody and
visitation issues are, then, to be determined by looking at the
child's best interests.5' The court reasoned that the purpose for
the allowance of these rights to psychological parents is in re-
sponse to the "recognition that children have a strong interest in
maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and
provide for them."2
In addition to the doctrines used by the courts to help recognize
the parental rights of non-biological co-parents, there are alterna-
tives available to a non-biological parent who wishes to protect his
or her parental rights. Among the alternatives most often used
are co-parenting agreements and second-parent adoption.
VI. SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
In an effort to protect a family who is adopting a child from the
later intrusion of the natural parents, most state laws include a
provision that prohibits adoption by another adult until the rights
of the legal parents have been terminated. 3 However, an excep-
tion has been recognized for step-parents, which provides that the
51. Id. at 543.
52. Id.
53. V.C., 748 A.2d at 544.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 551.
56. Id. at 554.
57. Id. at 550.
58. Shapiro, supra note 43, at 26.
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spouse of the child's biological or adoptive parent may adopt the
child without the termination of the biological or adoptive parent's
rights.54 This allows the child to enjoy the benefits of having two
legal parents. Among the benefits enjoyed are inheritance and
support rights, as well as health and other benefits provided by
either parent's employers.55 However, since 49 of the 50 states do
not permit homosexual couples to legally marry, step-parent adop-
tion is not an option for same-sex couples
When two lesbians decide to have a child, they have two options;
they can either adopt a child, or one of the women can conceive
and give birth. While most state's adoption statutes have been
interpreted as allowing gay and lesbians to adopt, the laws of Flor-
ida and Mississippi prohibit gay or lesbian individuals from adopt-
ing under all circumstances.56 Second-parent adoption has devel-
oped in response to the difficulties gay and lesbian couples have
encountered where both wish to be recognized as legal parents to
their children.
Second-parent adoptions permit the partner of a legal parent to
adopt the legal parent's child without requiring the legal parent to
terminate his or her parental rights.57 Second-parent adoption has
most often been utilized to permit the non-biological mother in a
lesbian couple to become recognized as a legal mother to her part-
ner's biological child. The significance of second-parent adoption
is that, upon separation, the non-biological parent has the same
parental rights to the child as does the biological parent, thereby
ensuring the non-biological parent's legal right to custody, or at
least to visitation. While second-parent adoptions can alleviate
some concerns, not all states permit them. Currently, only eight
states and the District of Columbia have approved second-parent
adoptions for gay and lesbian couples.58 On August 20, 2002,
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court held,
59. Jane Schacter, Construction Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislature and
Second Parent Adoption, 75 CHi.-KENT L.REv. 933, 937 (2000).
60. Id. at 936.
61. Id. at 943-44.
62. See THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS
(June 29, 2004), available at http:www.center4civilrights.org/secadopt.htm.
63. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, HRC FamilyNet, Second-Parent
Adoption June 29, 2004, available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Adoption
The states that currently permit second-parent adoption for lesbian and gay parents are:




[T]here is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two
unmarried same-sex partners (or unmarried heterosexual
partners) from adopting a child who had no legal parents. It
is therefore absurd to prohibit their adoptions merely because
their children were either the biological or adopted children of
one of the partners prior to the filing of the adoption peti-
tion.59
VII. CHILD SUPPORT
A critical issue relevant to the topic of this Comment is that of
child-support obligations. Such obligations are often difficult to
enforce upon a non-biological parent where a second parent adop-
tion has not been granted. As discussed above, while many states
now recognize doctrines to permit visitation by non-biological par-
ents, no state currently provides for mandatory support to be paid
when the non-biological parent is not seeking visitation or custody
rights. Recently, an appellate Court in California held that a les-
bian woman was not a parent of the children within the meaning
of the Uniform Parentage Act and, therefore, the UPA could not be
used to impose a support order upon her.'° This conclusion was
reached despite the presentation of evidence showing that the two
women jointly selected the children's names and hyphenated their
last names as the children's surname, and held the children out as
being children of both of them."'
In December 2002, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented a party from denying
an obligation for monetary support while maintaining that the
doctrine of in loco parentis provided her with standing to seek visi-
tation rights. 2 In L.S.K v. H.A.N., H.A.N. claimed that she was
not under a legal duty to provide support relying on the reasoning
of Garman v. Garman, which held that generally a stepparent has
no legal duty to support a stepchild following a dissolution of mar-
riage.' Unlike the California holding above, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that when a stepparent holds a child out as
his own, he may be estopped from denying paternity and will
64. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F. and In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 803
A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002).
65. Elisa Maria B. v. Emily B. et al., 118 Cal.App.4th 966 (2004).
66. Elisa Maria B., 118 Cal.App. 4th 966.
67. L.S.K v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. 2002).
68. L.S.K, 813 A-2d 872.
69. Id. (citing Garman, 646 A.2d 1251(Pa. 1994)).
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therefore be responsible to support the stepchild relying on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.65 That same reasoning was applied
to the decision in H.A.N. and resulted in a holding that H.A.N.
was responsible for paying child support.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In addition to parental rights, there are numerous other hurdles
same-sex couples face. In the July 2004 issue of the ABA Journal,
an article entitled "The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues,"
points out the difficulty faced by attorneys in advising their homo-
sexual clients due to the Defense of Marriage Act adopted by Con-
gress in 1996. This legislation does not force the states to give full
faith and credit to same-sex marriages, which may be lawful in
other states.66 Currently, Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado is
sponsoring a proposed constitutional amendment, declaring,
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union
of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the
constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any
union other than the union of a man and a woman.6 7
However, neither the Democratic, nor Republican leaders are
able to agree on a procedure for a vote. Thus, it is unknown as to
when, if ever, the proposed amendment will be voted upon.68
Legalizing same sex marriages may help protect the rights of
same sex partners when they part ways by conferring upon each
party legal rights to their children. As this comment addressed,
the issue of legal rights is critical when it comes to child custody
and visitation rights of the non-biological parent. While many
state courts are slowly but surely recognizing the changing defini-
tion of what constitutes a "family," it is unlikely that homosexual
marriages will be legalized widely any time soon. Therefore, the
70. Id. at 878.
71. Jill Schachner Chanen, THE CHANGING FACE OF GAY LEGAL ISSUES, A.B.A. J. 47,
48-9, Vol. 90, July 2004.
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legal fictions currently used to recognize parental rights of non-
biological parents are becoming increasingly important.
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